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Over the past 150 years, the global monetary system has 
seen a number of varying degrees of links between dif-
ferent currencies (Box 1). Periods of very strong ties bet-
ween the main currencies of the global economy (like 
during the gold standard or the Bretton Woods system) 
alternated (at least shortly) with regimes of relatively 
high flexibility of exchange rates (mostly after the break-
down of relatively narrow regimes), e.g. after the end of 
the gold standard in the 1920s and when the intra-Eu-
ropean exchange rates became much more flexible fol-
lowing the collapse of the European currency system at 
the beginning of the 1990s. From a global perspecti-
ve, there has been a tendency towards more flexible ex-
change rates in the past years.2
advantages and Disadvantages of flexible 
and fixed Exchange Rates
The global economic and financial crisis has caused 
doubts about the existing global exchange rate system. 
Strong fluctuations in exchange rates, be it between the 
US Dollar and the Euro or Eastern European currencies, 
regularly lead to financial market uncertainties, while at 
the same time fixed exchange rates like between China 
and the USA support the build-up of massive imbalan-
ces. In principle, two extreme forms of exchange rate 
regimes can be imagined: Full flexibility and a comple-
te fixing of global exchange rates. Full flexibility would 
hold the advantage of combating global imbalances and 
the spill-over of economic ups and downs. With flexib-
le exchange rates, a country’s current account surplus 
leads to the appreciation of the local currency because 
of higher demand for the domestic currency. This ma-
kes exports more expensive on the global market, whe-
reas prices for imports go down from the country’s own 
perspective. As a consequence, the foreign trade surplus 
diminishes. An excessive, permanent export surplus of 
2   The establishment of the European Monetary Union obviously works 
against this trend.
The financial crisis of 2007/2008 and the current “Euro crisis” chal-
lenge the current global monetary system. They drastically reveal 
the actual system’s weaknesses und show the eminent importance 
of the international monetary system for the stability of markets and 
national economies. DIW Berlin was commissioned by the Federal 
Ministry of Finance to research possible alternatives to the existing 
exchange rate regime. In principle, neither of the two extremes – 
completely free or fixed exchange rates – is suitable. A mixed system 
is preferable – with improvements to the status quo, though. An 
exchange rate regime with few big currency areas, which are linked 
to each other with flexible exchange rates, should be the aim of 
reforms. This should correspond to a multi-polar key currency system 
with the currently dominating US Dollar and the Euro as well as the 
Chinese Renmimbi as most important actors. These developments 
should be accompanied by substantial improvements in the regula-
tory framework of the financial markets. Necessary elements are a re-
inforced global and especially European economic coordination and 
an internationally agreed-on, assertive financial market authority.1
1   This report is based on a comprehensive study on the same topic carried out by DIW Berlin on behalf 
of the Federal Ministry of Finance. See Belke, A., Bernoth, K., Fichtner, F. (2011): Die Zukunft des 
internationalen Währungssystems. DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt (currently being published).
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The disadvantages of a fixed exchange rate regime or 
its extreme case – a global currency – can be deducted 
from the described advantages of a flexible exchange 
rate system. Especially the danger of excessive current 
account imbalances is a lot higher with fixed exchange 
rates. This is especially true when national economies 
in different stages of development come together.
The French G20 presidency introduced the concept of 
“Bretton Woods II”7 – an effort to remodel the global 
monetary system named after the 1944 agreement for 
a post-war monetary order. This concept aims for stron-
ger ties between the exchange rates of the big indust-
rialized and emerging countries. At least G20 mem-
bers were to agree on exchange rate corridors. But if we 
look closely, such a regime does not seem beneficial: It 
would probably hold both the disadvantages of flexible 
exchange rates and the disadvantages of fixed exchange 
rates. Exchange rate corridors (in contrast to really fixed 
exchange rates) do not solve the problem of exchange 
rate induced insecurity. Short-term fluctuations espe-
cially on the capital markets could still lead to sudden 
reversals of capital flows,. The problem of imbalances 
building up is not solved either. In a world with several 
economic centers (USA, Eurozone, China, South Ame-
rica etc.), which develop quite differently, such a rigid 
system is doomed to fail.
mixed system still Best alternative
The status quo regime as a mixed system with the US 
Dollar as central anchor currency in international trade 
and capital movement is probably not the worst solution. 
However, we learn from the developments especially of 
the last decade, that excessive imbalances between nati-
onal economies in different stages of development need 
to be prevented with flexible exchange rates. A (possibly 
limited) flexibilization of the Chinese Renminbi in rela-
tion to the US Dollar would be desirable in order to mi-
tigate the enormous Chinese current account surplus 
(as well as its mirrored excessive US deficit) through the 
revaluation of the Chinese currency.
At the same time, the advantages of fixed exchange rates 
should be used in global trade. According to calculations 
by DIW Berlin, fixed exchange rates hold significant po-
sitive growth effects, especially for industrialized coun-
tries. The reason is their strong exposure to internatio-
7   The term “Bretton Woods II“ is not clearly defined. The name is sometimes 
also used for the pre-crisis monetary system with the US Dollar as key currency 
and fixed exchange rates to emerging countries, which showed some parallels 
to the post-war system. See e.g. Dooley, M.P. et al. (2004): The Revised Bretton 
Woods System. In: International Journal of Finance and Economics, Vol. 9, 
207-313.
the type we observe in case of the Chinese economy is 
less probable in a system of flexible exchange rates.
In many other emerging countries, this connection 
works the other way around: Based on their high econo-
mic growth, domestic demand and imports as well as do-
mestic consumption are strong, causing a high current 
account deficit, which is mitigated by devaluation.3
On the whole, flexible exchange rates can contribute to 
an improved resource allocation because of their abili-
ty to quickly adapt to new economic conditions. In the 
role of automatic stabilizers they mitigate international 
spill-overs of price and cyclical fluctuations, reduce in-
security and, thus, promote investment activity.4 Even 
more so, flexible exchange rates allow for an indepen-
dent monetary policy5 which is able to respond to nati-
onal economic ups and downs and to  contribute to do-
mestic economic stabilization and better framework con-
ditions for economic growth on the whole.
On the other hand, there are a number of reasons for 
further international stabilization of exchange rates. 
Even the introduction of a global currency has its fol-
lowers, even among economists.6 The main argument 
in favor of fixed exchange rates or a global currency is 
efficiency. Growing international transparency contri-
butes to stronger trade flows and more intense use of 
the advantages of international division of labor. Fur-
thermore, real economic investment activity can incre-
ase, since international investments become more at-
tractive with declining risk premia (because of the end 
of exchange rate risks). Both connections have the ca-
pacity to promote growth, with the growth dynamic in 
this case resulting from the stabilization of internatio-
nal economic relations in contrast to a flexible exchange 
rate regime.
3   Examples for such emerging countries with high current account deficits 
are India and Brazil. China is somehow atypical because of its export-driven 
growth and the resulting current account surplus.
4   See Friedman, M. (1953): The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates. In: Essays 
in Positive Economics, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 157-203. The 
precondition for mitigated price fluctuations is the endogenous reaction of 
exchange rates to changed foreign prices. But if exchange rates are understood 
as a variable which is for example influenced by capital markets, changing 
exchange rates may also cause destabilizing influence. See also Meese, R.A. 
and Rogoff, K. (1983): Empirical Exchange Rate Models of the Seventies: Do 
They Fit out of Sample? Journal of International Economics, 14, 3-24. They 
demonstrate that exchange rates fluctuate more frequently than justified by 
fundamental data.
5   The currency trilemma points out that fixed exchange rates are not 
possible with an autonomous monetary policy and free movement of capital. 
See the fundamental article by Mundell, R. (1962): Capital Mobility and 
Stabilization Policy under Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates. In: Canadian 
Journal of Economic and Political Science, Vol. 29, 475-485.
6   See e.g. the web site of Robert Mundell, Nobel prize winner in Economics 
and advocate of a global currency, for a list of academic publications: http://
robertmundell.net/economic-policies/world-currency/.13 DIW Economic Bulletin 4.2011
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international investors.8 Furthermore, a common sup-
ranational monetary policy may find it easier to build 
up reputation and guarantee independence from natio-
8   See Rogoff, K. et al. (2004): Evolution and Performance of Exchange Rate 
Regimes, IMD Occasional Paper No. 229, International Monetary Fund, 
Washington, D.C.
nal capital and trade flows. Also emerging countries will 
probably profit from their integration in fixed exchange 
rates regimes or regional monetary unions, since the re-
sulting greater stability improves their attractiveness for 
The Gold Standard (1871-1914)
From a historic perspective, the gold standard was probably 
the most comprehensive international monetary system. Its 
center piece was the guarantee of stable exchange rates for the 
conversion of national currencies in gold. In order to ensure this 
fixed convertibility, the member states of the gold standard 
were obliged to keep currency reserves. Despite a lack of strict 
fiscal and monetary targets, the stability-oriented policy of the 
most important European member states France, Germany and 
Great Britain guaranteed an overall smooth functioning of the 
gold standard until World War I.
The Bretton Woods System (1944-1971)
With their accession to the Bretton Woods system, the member 
states agreed to stabilize their exchange rates to the Dollar 
and, if necessary, to intervene on the currency markets in order 
to limit exchange rate fluctuations to a certain margin. As key 
currency, the value of the Dollar was in turn tied to a fixed 
gold price. Already in the middle of the 1960s, the growing 
US deficit did no longer guarantee the gold backing of the US 
Dollar, de facto turning the Gold/ Dollar standard into a Dollar 
standard. Over time, different developments of productivity 
resulted in real distortions of the exchange rates, causing 
instability in the system.
The European Payments Union (1950-1958)
The European Payments Union (EPU) was introduced in 1950. 
It guaranteed international convertibility of Western European 
currencies in the Bretton Woods system. The EPU’s core was its 
payment system, which was based on a multilateral compensa-
tion system where surpluses and deficits of all member states 
were centrally processed through the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS). The payment of gold and dollars in the 
case of a deficit was a financial incentive for export-oriented 
growth, limited excessive deficits and made structural reforms 
more attractive.
The European Monetary System 
“Snake in the Tunnel” (1972-1979)
In the framework of the so-called “snake in the tunnel”, the 
member states agreed to stabilize the exchange rates of their 
currencies within a defined corridor. After the oil crises, unco-
ordinated national fiscal and monetary policies quickly led to 
diverging inflation rates, and finally also to the collapse of the 
agreement.
The Exchange Rate Mechanism of the EMS (1979-1993)
The heart of the European Monetary System (EMS) was the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), which limited fluctuations 
between exchange rates. After the complete liberalization of 
capital movements in 1986, national monetary policy partly 
lost its controlling function over macroeconomic developments. 
When the German Federal Bank raised its interest rates in 
reaction to the reunification boom, the other EMS states were 
forced to do the same despite their weak growth, in order to 
stabilize their currencies in relation to the Deutsche Mark, 
pushing their economies into a recession. The resulting imba-
lances finally led to the end of the EMS.
The European Economic and Monetary Union (since 1999)
In 1992, the member states of the European Union (EU) agreed 
on the establishment of the European Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU). For Germany, the EMU is historically unique, 
since it is the first international currency regime which is based 
on completely and irrevocably fixed exchange rates, leaving 
no room for national monetary sovereignty. This means that 
EMU states with balance of payments problems no longer have 
the option to influence the their deficits or competitiveness 
through exchange rate or interest rate manipulations. A cata-
log with convergence criteria was agreed on. Member states 
fulfilling the criteria are obliged to participate in the common 
currency. In contrast to the Bretton Woods system or the EMS, 
there is no key currency which would grant one member state 
certain privileges.
Box  1
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national Monetary Fund as central reserve asset in the 
international monetary system. They have been in use 
as artificial currency unit since 1969 and could reduce 
the dependence of the monetary system on the mone-
tary policy of the USA (or other big economic regions).12  
As such, the current very expansive monetary policy of 
the Federal Reserve Bank causes inflation on the inter-
national capital and resource markets because the US 
Dollar de facto holds a monopoly as trade currency. But 
if SDR are really to play a global role, deep and liquid 
markets need be created for SDR – not only through in-
creased issuing by the IMF, but also through the deve-
lopment of a private market for SDR. Furthermore, it is 
feared that in the case of only vague emission rules the 
stock of SDR might increase drastically.13 This would li-
mit the direct control of the central banks over the cir-
culating amount of money, thus also limiting their so-
vereignty. 
Recently, the role of gold in an international moneta-
ry system became again the subject of debate. Theo-
retically, gold could be a logic store of value for inter-
national investors and central banks if trust in the US 
Dollar is declining. In practice, however, central banks 
worldwide have drastically reduced their share of gold 
reserves during the last century. The reasons are clear. 
Because of its physical properties, gold is considerably 
less suitable for emergency financial transactions (e.g. 
purchases of currencies to fend depreciation pressure 
against the US Dollar or  the grant of ‘emergency finan-
cial packages’ by the IMF) than monetary means of pay-
ment. This applies also to the payment of imports or of 
interest on foreign debt.14
A realistic long-term alternative to the current system is 
first and foremost the establishment of several currenci-
es sharing the role of key and reserve currency. The US 
Dollar is probably going to lose some of its dominance 
and the Euro as well as the Chinese Renminbi will very 
likely gain in importance in the future. Such a process 
would strengthen the international monetary system at 
the end of the day, because international investments 
would be more equally spread and interest rate distor-
tions would be reduced. The emitters of reserve curren-
cies would be compelled to stricter monetary policy dis-
12   See Dorucci, E., McKay, J. (2011): The International Monetary System 
After the Financial Crisis. ECB Occasional Paper No. 123; Eichengreen, B. 
(2011): Exorbitant Privilege – The Rise and Fall of the Dollar and the Future of 
the International Monetary System. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
13   See Cooper, R.N. (2011): Is SDR Creation Inflationary? Report by Richard 
Cooper, Harvard University, as Independent External Consultant to the IMF, 
Washington, D.C., January 7.
14   See Eichengreen, 2011, l.c.
nal governments than it would be possible for national 
monetary policies in emerging countries.
In a long-term perspective one should aim for a global 
monetary system consisting of several regional curren-
cy areas. But for the establishment of these regional 
currency areas the success conditions of regional com-
mon currencies need to be taken into account, as can 
be found in the theory of optimum currency areas (Box 
2). In this context it should also be noted that some im-
portant national economies have not yet become invol-
ved in economic integration strategies. It would be hel-
pful, if India and China took first steps towards joi-
ning a regional integration area or establishing a new 
one. But above all it must be guaranteed that exchange 
rate pegs between economic regions which extremely 
differ in their fundamentals are reduced. One means 
could be the revaluation of the currencies concerned in 
a new key currency system. We will enlarge upon that 
in the next section.
the Question of the key currency
At the moment, the US Dollar is relatively unchallenged 
as key and reserve currency; a major part of internatio-
nal trade and credit transactions are carried out in US 
Dollar, a big part (61 percent in 2010) of currency reser-
ves of the central banks are held in US Dollar. While the 
Euro gained importance in the period before the financi-
al crisis (the share of international currency reserves in 
Euro increased from 18 to 27 percent between 1999 and 
2010), the phase of the US Dollar appreciation after the 
Lehman bankruptcy has underlined the international 
importance of the Dollar as a safe haven and strengthe-
ned its role as most important international means of ex-
change. Medium-term, a mono-polar international glo-
bal monetary system with a dominating Dollar is pro-
bably going to persist. The reasons are inertia effects, 
network externalities and the still unequalled size and 
liquidity of the US financial markets.9
China has been one of the advocates10 for a long-term pro-
motion of the special drawing rights11 (SDR) of the Inter-
9   See Lim, E.-G. (2006): The Euro’s Challenge to the Dollar: Different Views 
from Economists and Evidence from COFER (Currency Composition of Foreign 
Exchange Reserves) and Other Data. IMF Working Paper WP/06/153, 
International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C. 
10   See Zhou, x. (2009): Reform of the International Monetary System, essay 
posted on the website of the People’s Bank of China, 9 April. www.pbc.gov.cn/
english/detail.asp?col=6500&id=178
11   SDR are credit lines on currencies of IMF member states. The value of the 
SDR is based on a basket of the four most important currencies (US Dollar, 
Euro, Yen and Pound Sterling). It is not a currency in the sense of a means of 
exchange since there are no private markets for the trading of SDR.15 DIW Economic Bulletin 4.2011
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markets.16 The US Dollar, the currency of the biggest 
national economic region with the most liquid mar-
kets, is going to be the primus inter pares in the medi-
um term. The Euro with an economic region of similar 
importance holds the potential to become more attracti-
ve. This will probably take place once the euro zone has 
solved its debt crisis convincingly. China has already be-
gun to encourage foreigners step by step to use the Ren-
minbi (RMB) for goods and financial transactions.17 It 
is likely that this strategy will result in a higher attrac-
16   An international currency is defined as a unit of payment which is 
globally accepted as contracting currency in trade, as freely convertible unit of 
account and as liquid investment currency of a well developed financial market.
17   Stier, O., Bernoth, K., Fisher, A. (2010): Die Internationalisierung des 
chinesischen Renminbi: eine Chance für China. DIW Wochenbericht Nr.. 
20/2010.
cipline in order to keep the status of reserve currency 
and the advantages of “exorbitant privilege”15.
Policy for a new global monetary system
A precondition for the transition to a multi-polar mo-
netary system is the establishment of several currenci-
es as international means of payment on the currency 
15   “Exorbitant privilege” means the advantage of the emitter of the key and 
reserve currency to incur debts abroad at low interest rates, since the demand 
for bonds in the respective currency is quite high. At the same time, assets 
abroad yield high returns, because the high demand for the reserve currency 
results in higher interest payments. Another advantage for the key currency 
country is high money creation profit, since the amount of money in circulation 
is over-proportionally high.
The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas (OCA theory) lists 
criteria according to which monetary integration makes sense 
for national economies. Typically, traditional OCA theory takes 
the advantages of monetary integration for granted (e.g. 
higher transparency or lower transaction costs on international 
goods and capital markets) and identifies conditions limiting 
the disadvantages of monetary integration – above all, the loss 
of autonomous monetary policy which could mitigate country-
specific employment fluctuations.
Mundell identifies factor mobility as the most important 
determinant for the cost of monetary integration: He argues 
that excess or too low demand for labor in the member states 
of the union can be compensated by migration; thus, stabilizing 
monetary policy is dispensable if high labor mobility is given.1
Mundell’s seminal work was complemented by additional 
criteria: McKinnon points out the importance of the degree 
of openness: The more goods a country imports, the stronger 
is the influence of international goods prices on the domestic 
cost of living. Thus, the cost of the loss of national monetary 
policy is comparably low in this case, since the domestic central 
1  Mundell, R.A. (1961): A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas. American 
Economic Review, 51 (4), 657-665.
bank has less influence on price levels and employment.2 Kenen 
argues that a high degree of diversification within economies 
reduces the sensitivity of the member states’ reaction on 
external influences; cyclical fluctuations are mitigated and 
stabilizing monetary policy is less of a necessity. Other criteria 
concern the fiscal-policy integration of member states, capital 
mobility between member states or the population’s accep-
tance of integration. 
Recent progress in macroeconomic research tends to challenge 
traditional OCA theory. Especially the loss of stabilizing mone-
tary policy, which traditionally has been the most important 
disadvantage of monetary integration, is questionable under 
the assumption of rational expectations. Thus, more recent 
work on the OCA theory focuses less on the disadvantages of 
monetary integration, focusing more on the advantages of the 
establishment of a monetary union. In many cases, reduced 
uncertainty on goods and capital markets is identified as the 
central advantage of monitor integration.3 
2  McKinnon argues strictly Keynesian and assumes that the central bank 
is free to choose any point on a stable Phillips curve. See McKinnon, R.I. 
(1963): Optimum Currency Areas. American Economic Review, 53 (4), 
717-725.
3  Kenen, P.B. (1969): The Optimum Currency Area: An Eclectic View. In: 
R.A. Mundell, A.K. Swoboda (eds.): Monetary Problems of the International 
Economy, 41-60, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Box 2
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Conceptual faults of the financial authority need to be 
abolished, too. The discrepancy between mainly nati-
onal regulatory authorities and more and more inter-
nationally oriented financial markets must be reduced 
through the creation of new institutions or the restruc-
turing of existing bodies. They should not only moni-
tor national economies, but also check the implications 
of contagion, synergy and feedback effects and be able 
to intervene when the need arises. Some steps towards 
this aim have already been taken: Bodies like the Mutu-
al Assessment Group and the Financial Stability Board 
by the G20 as well as the IMF/World Bank’s Financi-
al Sector Assessment Program were created, which are 
to develop globally valid rules for financial stability and 
facilitate the implementation of national reforms for 
bank and financial market authorities with internatio-
nal support and coordination. On a European level, the 
Van Rompuy Task Force is currently working on an EU 
monitoring system for early detection of undesirable de-
velopments in the member states and specific recom-
mendations for correction.
However, a reform of the financial regulatory bodies 
must also take into account that the, in some cases, enor-
mous lack of information on financial and capital mar-
ket activities needs to be solved. Frequent, detailed and 
timely publication of important financial indicators for 
example on payment balances, trade with derivatives, 
currency market dependencies and cross-border ban-
king activities is essential for an early warning system. 
In this respect, there is still room for improvements.
It is crucial, however, that risks are not only detected, 
but that corrective measures can also be implemented 
better than in the past. The IMF for example should be 
given better intervention possibilities concerning deci-
sion-making processes of the receiving countries. Ano-
ther central issue is a strengthened regional coordina-
tion of financial (and economic) policies. In this con-
text, a stronger economic integration in the euro zone 
is desirable.
conclusion: Implications for European 
Policy makers
Further regional monetary integration (e.g. in the Eu-
ropean, Asian or Latin American regions) with flexib-
le exchange rates between the regions is, as described, 
the most likely and also the most advantageous scena-
rio for the future international monetary system. Based 
on the described benefits of fixed exchange rates, Eu-
ropean economic policy should in principle aim for an 
enlargement of the euro zone. This does, however, not 
mean to repeat the mistakes of the past and accept coun-
tiveness of the currency for international investors and 
central banks.18
In order to make the monetary system less susceptib-
le to the imbalances observed in the past which culmi-
nated in the financial crisis, further international coor-
dination of monetary and currency policies is a neces-
sity. It will be crucial that single countries do not try to 
gain an advantage by manipulating exchange rates or 
through inappropriate monetary and liquidity strategies. 
Because of the globalization of financial markets since 
the 1990s, direct cross-border spill-over effects between 
national (excess) amounts of money have further incre-
ased. Because of international capital flows, increased 
amounts of money in one country lead to an increase of 
liquidity in the financial markets of other economies as 
well. This has also reduced the central banks’ influence 
on the domestic money supply – making an internatio-
nal coordination even more important.
Experiences from the most recent and past financial cri-
ses show a clear correlation between capital mobility and 
crisis probability.19 If a country’s balance of payments 
suffers from massive in- or outflow of capital, it needs 
to be checked whether corrective measures like interest 
or exchange rate adaptations can be introduced. Espe-
cially in emerging countries, the development of dome-
stic financial and capital markets must be promoted in 
order to limit excessive in- and outflow of capital con-
tributing to global imbalances.20Additional symptom-
fighting measures (establishment of big currency re-
serves, introduction of capital movement controls, cur-
rency market interventions) can be helpful from time 
to time, too. However, they should only be used in addi-
tion to interest and exchange rate measures. Above all, 
a set of rules is required to regulate handling and form 
of capital movement controls. Based on this set of rules, 
efficient regulation as well as more effective consulting 
on the advantages and disadvantages of different inter-
vention instruments would be possible.21
18   Other candidates for key currencies are the Indian Rupee and the 
Brazilian Real. Both economies have to take on major restructuring tasks like 
China before their currencies can be used internationally.
19   Eichengreen, B. (2004): Capital Flows and Crises. Cambridge, London, 
MIT.
20   See Dell’Ariccia, G., di Giovanni, J., Faria, A., Kose, A., Mauro, P., Ostry, J.D., 
Schindler, M., Terrones, M. (2008): Reaping the Benefits of Financial 
Globalization. IMD Occasional Paper 264; Kose, A., Prasad, E., Rogoff, K., Wei, 
S. (2006): Financial Globalization: A Reappraisal. IMF Working Paper 06/189; 
Chinn, M.D., Ito, H. (2005): What Matters for Financial Development? Capital 
Controls, Institutions and Interactions. NBER Working Paper No. 11370; Chinn, 
M.D., Ito, H. (2008): East Asia and Global Imbalances: Savings, Investment and 
Financial Development. Paper prepared for the 18th Annual NBER-East Asian 
Seminar on Economics.
21   See IMF (2010): The Fund’s Mandate – The Future Financing Role: Reform 
Proposals. IMF Staff Paper.17 DIW Economic Bulletin 4.2011
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The formation of macroeconomic imbalances inside the 
EU, as they can be observed in current account imba-
lances or competitive differences on the labor market, 
has caused instability in the past. Based on a planned 
amendment to the EU Treaty, the “proposal for a regu-
lation on the prevention and correction of macroecono-
mic imbalances”, the European Commission is to issue 
early warnings and propose corrective action in the fu-
ture. However, there is the risk that the indicators for 
the identification of macroeconomic imbalances are so 
vaguely defined that the regulation will be less effecti-
ve. The German government still has the possibility to 
influence this regulation to make it more effective by 
advocating for a clear and detailed list of indicators and 
threshold values (scoreboard).22
Additionally, global policy-makers are called to support 
the stabilization of capital markets – also by assigning 
clear tasks to the IMF and the G-20. An improved fi-
nancial authority and financial market regulation, e.g. 
through new regulations on the monitoring of capital ac-
counts, better publication of financial market indicators 
and, above all, improved enforceability of proposals cor-
recting undesirable developments, would be first steps 
towards a crisis-proof global monetary system.
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tries with highly diverging economic performance. For 
the future of the EU, an economically homogenous cur-
rency area is probably of higher importance than a (still 
necessary) tightening of the fiscal convergence and sta-
bility criteria, since it mitigates the occurrence of ma-
croeconomic imbalances. At the same time, German 
economic policy should support macroeconomic integ-
ration in other economic regions by taking on a medi-
ating and consulting role in this context. Additionally, 
further global flexibilization of exchange rates should 
be an aim; in the short-term, this includes mainly the 
flexibilization of the pegged exchange rate between Chi-
na and the USA.
The transition to a multi-polar currency system with 
other reserve currencies besides the US Dollar like the 
Euro and the Renminbi would probably entail significant 
advantages for the Euro area countries, since the exis-
ting unilateral dependence on the US Dollar on global 
financial markets could be reduced. From a European 
perspective, the newly formed monetary dominance of 
the G-2 (China and USA) needs to be tackled as well. 
Because of the much more expansionary monetary po-
licy in the USA, this tends to work in favor of an appre-
ciation of the Euro. Once the Euro gains the status of a 
key currency, stronger global demand for the Euro re-
sults in additional seigniorage revenues; in turn, a sta-
bility-oriented (and thus growth-friendly) monetary po-
licy is needed to keep them.
In order to permanently establish the Euro as a key cur-
rency on capital markets besides the US Dollar, Europe 
must redesign the rules of the European Monetary Uni-
on. A strengthened EU governance framework has to in-
clude clear regulations for the handling of fiscal crises 
and provide preventive measures. Germany, for examp-
le, should work for better coordination of economic po-
licies in the euro zone. It is a step forward that, in the 
framework of the so-called “European semester”, EU 
member countries now need to submit their draft bud-
gets to the European Commission half a year before their 
adoption. This way, the Commission has more control 
over possible violations of the stability and growth pact 
(SGP) and is able to take preventive action if the neces-
sary. The lack of possibilities for sanctions in the case 
of SGP violations is still a problem, though. Significant 
improvements are still needed in this field. Realistically, 
a tightened SGP will only work with a stable European 
Union, with strong, democratically legitimized institu-
tions and high acceptance among the people. It is only 
then that we can expect European governments to ag-
ree to further coordination and to waive parts of their 
national sovereignty.